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Farewell to the "Serious Bodily Injury" Standard in Felonious
Assault Cases: After State v. Everhardt a Defendant Can be
Convicted if the Victim Sustains Serious Mental Injury
"The mind is no less a part of the person than the body, and the sufferings
of the former are sometimes more acute and lasting than those of the latter"
maintained the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1890 in Young v. Western
Union Telegraph Co. 1 This decision marked the first time a North Carolina
court held mental injury to be actionable in tort.2
In recent years the North Carolina Supreme Court has breathed new life
into the Young holding. In 1979 the court recognized as a tort the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 3 Three years later, in a rape case, the court
equated mental anguish with the injury element of a criminal statute.4 In assault
cases, however, the court consistently had interpreted the serious injury element
of the aggravated assault statute to include only serious bodily injury.5 Thus, the
decision in State v. Everhardt,6 holding that the serious injury element of an
assault statute includes serious mental injury, represents a dramatic break from
tradition.
This Note reviews the different levels of "injury" used by the North Caro-
lina General Assembly and by the North Carolina courts in criminal cases and
illustrates how North Carolina courts have expanded the definition of "injury"
in criminal cases to include mental injury. It also examines the recognition of
mental injury as a tort. This Note then considers the legitimacy of incorporating
mental injury into assault cases and discusses the consequences of the court's
reasoning in Everhardt. It concludes that the court's holding was logical in light
of the precedent and statutory language; however, it faults the court for failing
to provide any guidelines for future courts to follow in determining what consti-
tutes serious mental injury. To solve the problem, the Note suggests alternative
sources upon which to rely.
The Everhardts had been married for ten years before Mrs. Everhardt left
her husband in July 1984.7 Although she had been the victim of spousal abuse
for the previous two years, the six days of violence preceding her departure were
unprecedented.8 Among other things, the defendant had oral and vaginal sex
with the victim against her will, inserted the leg of a footstool into her vagina
1. 107 N.C. 370, 385, 11 S.E. 1044, 1048 (1890).
2. Id.
3. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 194, 254 S.E.2d 611, 620 (1979).
4. State v. Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 204, 297 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1982).
5. See, eg., State v. James, 321 N.C. 676, 688, 365 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1988); State v. Ferguson,
261 N.C. 558, 560, 135 S.E.2d 626, 627-28 (1964); State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 91, 128 S.E.2d 1, 3
(1962); State v. Owens, 65 N.C. App. 107, 111, 308 S.E.2d 494, 498 (1983); State v. Musselwhite, 59
N.C. App. 477, 480, 297 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1982); State v. Rotenberry, 54 N.C. App. 504, 511, 284
S.E.2d 197, 201 (1981); State v. Stephenson, 43 N.C. App. 323, 326, 258 S.E.2d 806, 807 (1979).
6. 326 N.C. 777, 392 S.E.2d 390 (1990).
7. Id. at 778, 392 S.E.2d at 392.
8. Id. at 778, 392 S.E.2d at 391-92.
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while he pointed a gun to her head, thrust a cola bottle into her vagina, and
forced her to eat a plate of spaghetti upon which he had ejaculated. 9 This series
of incidents led Mrs. Everhardt to fie charges of assault against her husband.
Six months after the assault, Mrs. Everhardt entered a program for victims
of spousal abuse. 10 In September 1985 she sought treatment for depression and
suicidal tendencies.11 She suffered from insomnia, poor appetite, and anxiety. 12
The following year she received medical attention for these conditions as well as
for anorexia nervosa. 13 She again sought treatment for anorexia nervosa in De-
cember 1986. At trial, one of her doctors testified that "she was trying to make
herself unattractive sexually by starving herself because of the sexual abuse she
had suffered in the past."' 14
The state charged Everhardt with assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury. Everhardt moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds of insuffi-
cient evidence but the trial court refused.15 The defendant appealed this ruling
and argued that there was insufficient evidence to support finding infliction of
serious injury. 16 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. 17 Although it refused to equate mental injury with serious injury, the
court of appeals stated that "serious physical injury may be proven even when it
is not evidenced immediately upon the impact of the assault. Case law and med-
ical science recognize that physical injury may later manifest itself as the result
of psychological trauma."18
The North Carolina Supreme Court accepted the defendant's appeal but
restricted its discretionary review to the "questions of whether mental injury will
support the element of serious injury under [North Carolina General Statutes
section 14-32], and if not, whether the evidence was sufficient to support a find-
ing of physical injury."'19 The court stated that it historically had defined "phys-
ical or bodily injury" as serious physical injury.20 Unlike the harm suffered by
the victim in this case, the injuries sustained in previous cases were of a physical
nature. No North Carolina court had ever decided whether mental injury alone
equals "physical or bodily injury."'21 Because the trauma endured by Mrs.
Everhardt did not fit readily into its traditional but "facile" definition of serious
injury,2 2 the court set out to address this issue.
9. Id. at 778, 392 S.E.2d at 391.
10. Id. at 779, 392 S.E.2d at 392.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. At trial, one of her doctors testified that he believed that this theory explained Mrs,
Everhardt's problems with anorexia nervosa. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see State v. Everhardt, 96 N.C. App. 1, 13, 384 S.E.2d 562, 569 (1989), aff'd, 326 N.C.
777, 392 S.E.2d 390 (1990).
17. Everhardt, 96 N.C. App. at 14, 384 S.E.2d at 570.
18. Id.
19. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 780, 392 S.E.2d at 392-93.
20. Id. at 780, 392 S.E.2d at 393; see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 780, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
22. Id.
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To differentiate this assault from those which were considered in previous
cases, the court discussed the degrading, dehumanizing aspects of Everhardt's
crime and recapped some of the "highlights" of the six-day period of abuse.23
Pointing to the repeated insults made by the defendant during the assaults as
illustrative of the demeanor of this assault, the court characterized the defend-
ant's implementation of such devices as "calculated to degrade and dehumanize
the victim." 24 The court then held that serious mental injury alone can satisfy
the serious injury element of felonious assault.25 It acknowledged that it could
have achieved the same result by examining the physical symptoms suffered by
Mrs. Everhardt in conjunction with her mental illness as the court of appeals
did.26 The supreme court, however, for undisclosed reasons, chose not to take
the court of appeals' circuitous route.27 While the court held that serious
mental harm satisfied the statutory injury element in the case of Mrs. Everhardt,
it provided no justification for why the evidence was sufficient in her case. In
addition, it elected not to adopt a "bright-line" rule; instead the court choose to
take the case-by-case approach advocated by previous North Carolina courts.
28
Although there are five elements of felonious assault under North Carolina
General Statutes Section 14-32,29 the key to the court's decision in Everhardt lies
in its interpretation of the injury element. The felonious assault statute requires
that the injury inflicted by the defendant be "serious injury. '" 30 The court, how-
ever, traditionally has construed "serious injury" to mean "serious bodily in-
jury," a more exclusive definition than that required by the statute.31
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 781, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(a) (1986). The five elements of felonious assault are: (1) assault,
(2) use of a deadly weapon, (3) intent to kill, (4) infliction of serious injury, and (5) injury short of
causing death. Id. This Note addresses only the injury element.
30. Id
31. In State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E.2d 1 (1962), the court established the framework for
determining whether a victim's injury constituted "serious bodily injury" under § 14-32. Jones,
charged and convicted of felonious assault for the shooting of the victim, appealed the trial judge's
jury instruction on serious injury. The instruction stated:
I instruct you in this case if you find beyond a reasonable doubt the assault was made with
a gun under such circumstance as calculated to create a breach of the peace that would
outrage the sensibilities of the community, it would be an assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury.
Id. at 90, 128 S.E.2d at 2. The supreme court concluded that such a definition did not effectuate
legislative intent because it did not "properly define the serious injury contemplated by the statute
under which the indictment was drawn." Id. at 92, 128 S.E.2d at 3. While many incidents "may be
calculated to create a breach of the peace that would outrage the sensibilities of the community," the
injuries do not always rise to the level of felonious assault. Id. The court held that
the term "inflicts serious injury" means physical or bodily injury resulting from an assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. The injury must be serious but it must fall short
of causing death. Further definition seems neither wise nor desirable. Whether such seri-
ous injury has been inflicted must be determined according to the particular facts of each
case.
Id. at 91, 128 S.E.2d at 3. The court apparently only wanted to provide the trial court some assist-
ance in ascertaining whether serious injury exists and, therefore, decided not to lay down a bright-
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In addressing Everhardt, the court could not rely upon the precedent that
defines "serious injury" as "serious bodily injury." If the court was going to
expand the definition to include serious mental injury, it would have to use the
plain language of the statute: "serious injury."'32 Nevertheless, the court could
not simply expand serious injury; it needed to rationalize its decision. Accord-
ingly, it turned to the North Carolina Supreme Court's construction of the
state's rape and sexual offense statute in which the legislature requires "serious
personal injury," the language of which is less restrictive than "serious bodily
injury" but more exclusive than "serious injury."'33
The first case in which the court defined "serious personal injury" to in-
clude "serious mental injury" was State v. Boone.34 Boone, the defendant and
uncle of the victim's husband, came to the victim's home to use the phone. 35
The victim permitted him to come into her home.36 After using the phone and
visiting with the victim, the defendant began smoking angel dust. 37 He suddenly
started to act strangely and attacked the victim. He hit the victim on the head
and forcibly committed sexual acts on her.38 The victim sustained bruises and
swelling on her head but refused to seek medical attention.39 She, however, was
hysterical and crying following the incident.4°
The State proffered evidence of the victim's injuries at trial. The trial judge
charged the jury that if it found that the defendant had "inflicted extreme terror,
fear, agitation and produced a state of hysteria to the extent that this was a
serious personal injury" in addition to the other elements of first-degree sexual
offense, it should find the defendant guilty.41 In his charge to the jury on at-
tempted first-degree rape, the judge directed the jury to rely upon the same defi-
nition of serious personal injury given in the sexual offense instruction.42 The
line rule. Id. at 92, 128 S.E.2d at 3. The court suggested that the trial court examine how the bullets
were removed, how far the bullets penetrated, and how long the victim was hospitalized. Id.
In State v. Owens, 65 N.C. App. 107, 111, 308 S.E.2d 494, 498 (1983), the court, guided by the
Jones framework, provided four additional factors for lower courts to examine in analyzing "serious
injuries." The Owens factors "include pain, loss of blood, hospitalization and time lost from work."
Id.; see also State v. Stephenson, 43 N.C. App. 323, 327, 258 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1979) (court relied on
similar factors in its serious injury analysis). Although both the Owens and Jones courts relied on
the victim's hospitalization in making their decisions, this factor is not conclusive. State v. Joyner,
295 N.C. 55, 65, 243 S.E.2d 367, 374 (1978) (court held "evidence that the victim was hospitalized is
not necessary for the proof of serious injury"); accord State v. Ferguson, 261 N.C. 558, 135 SE,2d
626 (1964); State v. Musselwhite, 59 N.C. App. 477, 297 S.E.2d 181 (1982); State v. Rotenberry, 54
N.C. App. 504, 284 S.E.2d 197 (1981); see also State v. James, 321 N.C. 676, 365 S.E.2d 579 (1988)
(the court's most recent application of the Jones framework).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(a) (1986).
33. Id. §§ 14-27.2(a)(2)b, .4(a)(2)b (1986).
34. 307 N.C. 198, 204-05, 297 S.E.2d 585, 589-90 (1982).
35. Id. at 200, 297 S.E.2d at 587.
36. Id.
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 202, 297 S.E.2d at 588.
42. Id. at 202-03, 297 S.E.2d at 588.
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defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual offense and attempted first-degree
rape.
On appeal, the defense argued that the State did not prove that he had
inflicted "serious personal injury," one of the elements of both first-degree sexual
offense and first-degree rape.43 The supreme court concluded that the trial
judge, through his instructions, had "limited the jury's consideration of the ele-
ment of 'serious personal injury' to mental or emotional injury."" This finding
prompted the court to consider whether mental injury actually can constitute
"serious personal injury" in North Carolina.
Because the court never had considered the scope of "serious bodily in-
jury," it examined prior treatment of the phrase.45 This review, however,
proved futile because cases involving the construction of "serious bodily injury"
only involved "tangible bodily injury and continuing suffering and pain."4
Searching for some type of guidance, the Boone court analyzed civil cases involv-
ing damages for mental injury in negligence cases and discovered that a plaintiff
may recover when he sustains mental stress as long as a physical injury also
results from the wrongful act.4 7 In addition, the court had acknowledged that a
plaintiff may recover "when the physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous
system instead of wounded or lacerated limbs, as those of the former class are
frequently much more painful and enduring than those of the latter."' 48 Based
on these principles, the court held that "serious mental injury" is "serious per-
sonal injury."49
The court then had to determine the standard required to satisfy "serious
mental injury." The court declined to "enunciate a 'bright line' rule as to when
the acts of an accused cause mental upset that could support a finding of 'serious
personal injury.' "50 Rather, it adopted the case-by-case approach, but also pro-
vided future courts with guidelines for making this determination. 5 1 The court
recognized that it would be rare to find a rape or sexual offense in which the
victim did not sustain some degree of mental injury.52 Because the legislature
created first and second degree attempted rape and sexual offenses, of which
only the former required "serious personal injury," the court concluded that
"serious mental injury" must be something more than the trauma suffered in
every rape and sexual offense.53 The court held that the State must demonstrate
that any mental or nervous illness resulting from a rape or a sexual offense "was
not only caused by the defendant but that the injury extended for some apprecia-
43. Id. at 201-02, 297 S.E.2d at 588.
44. Id. at 203, 297 S.E.2d at 588.
45. Id. at 203-04, 297 S.E.2d at 588-89 (the court discussed the definitions set forth in State v.
Jones and its progeny).
46. Id. at 204, 297 S.E.2d at 589 (citations omitted).
47. Id.
48. Id. (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 589.
51. Id. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 589-90.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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ble time beyond the incidents surrounding the crime itself."'5 4
In the Boone case, however, the court concluded that the evidence was not
sufficient to support a finding of serious personal injury because the State did not
prove "residual injury." s55 The evidence proffered by the State showed only that
the victim was hysterical and crying the morning of the incident.5 6 The court
found that these were the "results one could reasonably expect to be present
during and immediately after any forcible rape or sexual offense has been com-
mitted upon the female's person" and not injuries that extended for an "appreci-
able period of time."'57
In State v. Mayse 58 the North Carolina Court of Appeals had the first op-
portunity of a state appellate court to review a case to which the Boone holding
had been applied. Unlike the situation in Boone, the prosecution in Mayse intro-
duced evidence sufficient to surmount the "residual injury" hurdle and to be
labelled "serious personal injury." In Mayse, the defendant abducted the victim
at a convenience store and forced her to drive her car to three different loca-
tions59 and raped the victim three times before she ultimately escaped.6°
Unlike the case in Boone, the injuries sustained by the victim in Mayse
lasted an extended period of time. After the incident, the victim suffered from a
fragile mental state.61 At trial, she testified that she had to quit school because
she could not concentrate and that she felt she had to move and leave her job
because her coworkers treated her as if she had a disease.62 She also stated that
she had sought professional help from a mental health center and a shelter for
abused women.63 Furthermore, the victim stated that she never had such
problems before the incident and that she still suffered mental trauma at the
time of the trial, seven months after the incident.64
The defendant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree
rape. On appeal, he maintained that the evidence did not support a finding of
serious mental injury.65 The court of appeals disagreed. It held that the State
"clearly" had proven that "such injury was not only caused by the defendant but
54. Id. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 590.
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id.
58. 97 N.C. App. 559, 389 S.E.2d 585, cert denied, 326 N.C. 803, 393 S.E.2d 903 (1990); see
also State v. Davis, 101 N.C. App. 12, 23, 398 S.E.2d 645, 651-52 (1990) (court also found "serious
mental injury").
59. Mayse, 97 N.C. App. at 560, 389 S.E.2d at 586.
60. Id. at 560-61, 389 S.E.2d at 586.
61. Id. at 563, 389 S.E.2d at 587.
62. Id The victim stated:
I felt so degraded; I felt so ashamed, like everybody was looking at me and whispering. I
was scared; I was afraid. I mean, some people knew what had happened.... [People]
walked around like they were on eggshells. You know, it was like they'd whisper when I'd
come into a room or something.
Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
[Vol. 691522
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that the injury extended for some appreciable time beyond the incidents sur-
rounding the crime itself as required by State v. Boone." 66 The court of appeals
affirmed the conviction, holding that the victim had suffered serious mental
injury.67
To gain a better understanding of what is a sufficient mental injury, it is
helpful to examine the evolution of mental injury as an actionable wrong in
North Carolina civil cases. The North Carolina Supreme Court first recognized
intentional infliction of emotional distress as an actionable tort in Stanback v.
Stanback.6 8 The case involved a suit brought by Mrs. Stanback against her for-
mer husband for breach of contract.69 She sought to recover actual, consequen-
tial, and punitive damages.70 In the portions of her complaint in which she
requested consequential and punitive damages, she alleged that the defendant
had inflicted mental anguish.71 The trial court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss the suit except the plaintiff's request for actual damages for the breach
of contract.72 The plaintiff appealed. 73 The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
missal, and the supreme court granted the plaintiff's petition for discretionary
review. 74
With respect to the allegations of mental injury, the court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the portion of the complaint seeking consequential damages
for mental anguish.75 The court did not reach the same result in terms of the
allegations made in the portion of the complaint asking for punitive damages.
Instead, it found that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.76
In this case of first impression, the Stanback court determined the parame-
ters of this tort. Relying on prior cases in the state involving mental injury, the
court stated that "the plaintiff must show some physical injury resulting from
the emotional disturbance caused by defendant's alleged conduct" to establish
intentional infliction of emotional distress.77 Although such physical injury was
present in this case, the court found Stanback's allegations of great mental
anguish sufficient to go to the jury to determine whether this anguish caused
physical injury.7s Hence, the court took a expansive view of what constitutes
physical injury,79 a stand supported by precedent. The court stated:
"The nerves are as much a part of the physical system as the limbs,
66. Id. at 563-64, 389 S.E.2d at 587.
67. Id. at 564, 389 S.E.2d at 587-88.
68. 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
69. Id. at 183, 254 S.E.2d at 614.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 194-96, 254 S.E.2d at 620-21.
72. Id. at 184, 254 S.E.2d at 615.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 184-85, 254 S.E.2d at 615.
75. Id. at 195, 254 S.E.2d at 620-21.
76. Id. at 196, 254 S.E.2d at 621-22.
77. Id. at 198-99, 254 S.E.2d at 623.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 198, 254 S.E.2d at 623.
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and'in some persons are very delicately adjusted and when 'out of tune'
cause excruciating agony. We think the general principles of the law
of torts support a right of action for physical injuries resulting from
negligence, whether willful or otherwise, none the less strongly because
the physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous system instead of
lacerated limbs." 80
This language suggesting a requirement of physical manifestation of mental
injury concerned later courts that addressed the mental injury question. In
Dickens v. Puryear,8 1 for example, the court disapproved of the Stanback physi-
cal manifestation requirement.8 2 It concluded that the language stemmed from
the Stanback court's effort to reconcile its decision with earlier cases involving
mental injury. 3 The Dickens court reasoned that these earlier cases
were concerned with a broader concept of liability than the relatively
narrow one now known as intentional infliction of emotional distress.
They were concerned with permitting recovery for injury, physical and
mental, intentionally or negligently inflicted.... To the extent.., that
these earlier cases required some 'physical injury' apart from mere...
mental distress and, in addition, talked in terms of foreseeability, they
did so in the context of negligently inflicted injuries and not in the
context of the tort ... intentional infliction of emotional distress. 84
Accordingly, the Dickens court held that "[r]ecovery may be had for the emo-
tional distress so caused and for any other bodily harm which proximately re-
sults from the distress itself."8 5
Recently, in Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates,8 6 the
court faced the issues of mental injury and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. It clarified its position in Dickens and offered a "bright line" rule:
Where a defendant's negligent act has caused a plaintiff to suffer mere
fright or temporary anxiety not amounting to severe emotional dis-
tress, the plaintiff may not recover damages for his fright and anxiety
on a claim for infliction of emotional distress. Where, however, such a
plaintiff has established that he or she has suffered severe emotional
distress as a proximate result of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff
need not allege or prove any physical impact, physical injury, or physi-
cal manifestation of emotional distress in order to recover on a claim
80. Id. at 199 n.1, 254 S.E.2d at 623 n.I (quoting Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 403-04,
55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906)).
81. 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).
82. Id. at 447-48, 276 S.E.2d at 332-33.
83. Id. For examples of these earlier cases see Williamson v. Bennet, 251 N.C. 498, 507, 112
S.E.2d 48, 54 (1960) (recovery denied for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury be-
cause the connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury was too remote); Kirby v.
Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 810-13, 188 S.E. 625, 626-28 (1936) (court held that fright
alone was not actionable but plaintiff may recover for physical manifestation of fright or for some
mental impairment stemming from fright).
84. Dickens, 302 N.C. at 451-52, 276 S.E.2d at 334.
85. Id. at 452-53, 276 S.E.2d at 335.
86. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990); see Note, A Clear Judicial Day in North Carolina-
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics Smooths the Way for Plaintiffs' Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress, 69 N.C.L. Rev. 1714 (1991).
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for negligent infliction of emotional distress.8 7
The standards for mental injury established in civil cases were important to
the court in State v. Boone88 since it was the first case in North Carolina to
address the mental injury issue in a criminal context. In its search for support
for expanding the definition of "serious personal injury" to include mental injury
for first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense cases, the Boone court turned
to civil cases for authority, as the criminal cases defining serious injury only
"involved tangible bodily injury and continuing suffering and pain."8 9 Thus,
when the Everhardt court wanted to take the same step with respect to assault
cases, it, in turn, looked to Boone for guidance.90
On the surface, this reliance is disconcerting because rapes and assaults are
quite dissimilar by nature. In addition, although placed in the same statutory
act, their legislative definitions bear little resemblance. On the one hand, to gain
a conviction for a rape, the State must proffer evidence of "serious personal
injury;" on the other hand, to establish an aggravated assault, the State need
only show "serious injury." 9 1 These two phrases seemingly demand different
levels of evidence; however, this language provides the common denominator
that explains Boone's role in the Everhardt court's analysis.
Determining the scope of "serious injury" comprised the main thrust of the
Everhardt court's reasoning. Although the court previously limited the reach of
this phrase to "serious bodily injury," the court recognized that it was not bound
by this judicially created constraint. Searching for guidance, the court turned to
the only other criminal case in which an injury had been held to include mental
injury-Boone. In this situation, the same act of the defendant constituted both
crimes, and "where possible, statutes dealing with the same subject matter must
be harmonized to give effect to each."192 The court therefore had an obligation
to make certain that "serious injury" and "serious personal injury" were given a
uniform construction. Looking to Boone and its interpretation of "serious per-
sonal injury," the Everhardt court made a reasonable deduction: "'Serious in-
jury' may be construed to be as broad or broader than 'serious personal injury,'
as the former contains no adjective qualifying the nature of the injury, other
than the requirement that it be a serious one."'93
The similarities between the felonious assault in Everhardt and rape, in all
87. Id. at 303-04, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
88. 307 N.C. 198, 204, 297 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1982).
89. Id.
90. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 780, 392 S.E.2d at 392-93.
91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(2)(b) (1986) (rape); id. § 14-32(a) (1986) (felonious
assault).
92. State v. Jones, 97 N.C. App. 189, 196, 388 S.E.2d 213, 217 (1990); see also In re Brownlee,
301 N.C. 532, 549, 272 S.E.2d 861, 871 (1981) ("In seeking to ascertain and give effect to the legisla-
tive intent, an act must be considered as a whole. Statutes which deal with the same subject matter
must be construed in pan materia, and harmonized, if possible, to give effect to each.") (citations
omitted); State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 19-20, 187 S.E.2d 706, 718 (1972) ("In seeking to discover
and give effect to the legislative intent, an act must be considered as a whole, and none of its provi-
sions shall be deemed useless or redundant if they can reasonably be considered as adding something
to the act which is in harmony with its purpose.") (citations omitted).
93. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 781, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
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likelihood, made the court's decision to turn to Boone for direction easier. By
nature, rape and sexual offenses are degrading and dehumanizing crimes. As the
court in Boone asserted: "It would defy reason and common sense to say that
there could be forcible rape or forcible sexual offense which did not humiliate,
terrorize, and inflict some degree of mental injury upon the victim."' 94 These
traits are common in all rape cases. The assault inflicted upon Mrs. Everhardt
shared these distinctive features. Indeed, the Everhardt court stated that:
The assaults perpetrated on the victim were in the main psychologi-
cally torturous in nature, calculated to inflict mental or emotional in-
jury rather than bodily injury. The devices employed by defendant to
assault the victim, while potentially deadly as found by the jury, were
utilized in a manner calculated to degrade and dehumanize the victim.
This is illustrated by defendant's threats and insults repeated to the
victim during the perpetration of the assaults, as when he reminded
her that she was ugly, that no other man would ever want her, and that
she was stuck with him for the rest of her life.95
The facts of Everhardt are unique in their severity in comparison to other
assault cases reviewed by the supreme court; the assault in Everhardt is more
akin to a rape or sexual offense charge than to other assault cases. For example,
the Everhardt assault differed from the shootings in State v. Jones9 6 and in State
v. Owens.97 The evidence in those cases did not show that the weapons "were
utilized in a manner calculated to degrade and dehumanize the victim."98 None
of these victims testified: "I felt like I was the lowest person on the face of the
earth. I had no self-esteem, no confidence in myself."99 Rather, these harms
were brought about by an intent to inflict physical anguish. The defendants
simply wanted to cause physical pain, plain and simple. These injuries required
medical treatment, not repeated trips to mental health centers for treatment by
psychologists and therapists.
Arguably, it is unlikely that Everhardt will have a tremendous impact on
the typical assault case. After all, Everhardt was a case of first impression; in
prior assault cases reviewed by the court, the injuries inflicted were physical and
tangible in nature, leading one to infer that it is indeed rare for an assault victim
to sustain mental trauma. Such an inference is incorrect, however. Simply be-
cause the supreme court has not addressed the issue does not mean that victims
of shootings and stabbings do not sustain mental injury as Mrs. Everhardt
did. 1°° Perhaps the legal profession was not aware of the emotional conse-
quences of assault, and hence, no one bothered to make that argument.10 1 Vic-
94. Boone, 307 N.C. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 589.
95. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 780, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
96. 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E.2d 1 (1962). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 31.
97. 65 N.C. App. 107, 308 S.E.2d 494 (1983). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 31.
98. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 780, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
99. Id. at 779, 392 S.E.2d at 392.
100. Modlin, Is There an Assault Syndrome?, 13 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 139
(1985).
101. See Lurigio, Are All Victims Alike? The Adverse, Generalized, and Differential Impact of
Crime, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 452 (1987). The author suggests that literature on the emotional
[Vol. 691526
CRIMINAL LAW
tims of typical assaults also experience depression, repetitive nightmares, social
withdrawal, extreme phobias, and nausea.10 2 These victims obviously have sus-
tained "serious mental injury."
The supreme court, however, could elect to limit Everhardt to the case
where "the devices employed by the defendant to assault the victim ... were
utilized in a manner calculated to degrade and dehumanize the victim. ' 103
Although the court states that "serious injury, within the meaning and intent of
that term as used in N.C.G.S. § 14-32, includes serious mental injury caused by
an assault with a deadly weapon,"'04 leading one to believe that Everhardt ap-
plies to all felonious assault cases, the court's extensive characterization of the
assault as degrading and dehumanizing could create another inference. By fo-
cusing on this aspect of the assault, one might conclude that the court intends to
restrict Everhardt to cases in which "[tihe assaults... were in the main psycho-
logically torturous in nature, calculated to inflict mental or emotional injury
rather than bodily injury." 105
Such a demarcation would be unwise. As previously discussed, it is easy to
imagine a situation in which a victim of the typical assault suffered from severe
mental trauma. Consider this example: Tom, a young doctor, accompanied his
girlfriend to her office building. 106 As the two entered the elevator, a man ap-
proached them and pulled out a gun. 10 7 He placed the gun to Tom's head. 0 8
Tom managed to knock the gun out of the attacker's hands but a second man,
also carrying a pistol, entered the picture.'0 9 The second assailant shot Tom,
shattering his shoulder. 10 Since this incident, Tom has had nightmares of the
incident and changed his residency from surgery to internal medicine because
victims of physical injury so greatly disturbed him."' He finds it hard to con-
centrate at work and has turned to drinking to relieve his anxiety. 1 2 Tom suf-
fers from what doctors describe as post-traumatic stress syndrome, "a
disturbance that originates in response to an overwhelming encounter with the
possibility of violent death.""13 It is clear that Tom has sustained serious mental
injury as a result of his encounter; in all likelihood, if a state offered evidence of
these facts, a jury as well as an appellate court would, find it sufficient to satisfy
impact of crime on its victims has increased in recent years, id. at 453; therefore, it is entirely possi-
ble that lawyers and judges gave little attention to mental trauma in the past.
102. Modlin, supra note 100, at 139-43.
103. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 780, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
104. Id.
105. Id
106. Hendin, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Psychiatrist Discusses the Ramifications of Life-
Threatening Trauma, TRIMAL, Feb. 1987, at 63.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Although this disorder has been discussed primarily in terms of war and combat veter-
ans, doctors estimate that one-third to one-half of the civilians who have been exposed to a life-
threatening situation have showed symptoms of this disorder. Id.
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the "serious injury element" of aggravated assault. Because Tom also sustained
"serious bodily injury," the fact-finder or reviewing court could elect to pursue
the physical injury analysis. Had the bullet simply grazed Tom's shoulder, the
only way the State could establish "serious injury" would be to prove mental
anguish. Unlike the Everhardt assault, however, Tom's attack was not one in
which the means utilized to assault the victim were implemented "in a manner
calculated to degrade and dehumanize the victim"; 114 it was not "in the main
psychologically torturous in nature." 1 5 If the court elected to limit Everhardt's
application to such degrading and dehumanizing attacks, the State would be
unable to establish infliction of "serious injury" for victims such as Tom.
Finally, such a delineation is unworkable. Trial judges and juries, in all
probability, will struggle trying to ascertain what kind of assaults are "in the
main psychologically torturous in nature."116 Indeed, this language is amor-
phous and represents a more difficult adaptation than a bright-line rule encom-
passing all aggravated assaults. A bright-line rule is easily understood and
applied. 117 Its "purpose and effect [would be] to remove all doubt about the
proper scope" of Everhardt.118 A rigid rule allows courts to avoid hair-splitting
decision-making. 119 Thus, establishing an inflexible rule including all aggra-
vated assaults is the best solution for this situation.
Nevertheless, use of bright-line, rigid rules is not always desirable. As the
Everhardt court noted, its predecessors understandably did not want to curse the
phrase "serious bodily injury" with an inflexible definition. 120 Because victims
manifest their injuries in a variety of ways, 121 the task of encompassing all possi-
ble reactions would be impracticable if not impossible. No bright-line rule exists
"separating the significant from the insignificant." 122 Therefore, "the serious-
ness of the injury inflicted 'must be determined according to the particular facts
of each case.' "123 The Boone court followed the same principle in terms of
describing "serious mental injury." Logically, "the same rule must apply in
cases where the serious injury caused by the assault is mental in nature." 124
While taking a stand against shackling future courts with an unyielding
standard, prior courts have offered lower courts a skeletal framework with
which to work.125 Even in State v. Jones,126 the case in which the court first
enunciated case-by-case approach, the court listed important issues for the lower
114. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 780, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 237 n.9, 287 S.E.2d 810, 817 n.9 (1982).
118. State v. Hopkins, 70 N.C. App. 530, 536, 320 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1984).
119. State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 417, 306 S.E.2d 783, 788 (1983).
120. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 781, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
121. See Lurigio, supra note 101, at 453 (giving an in-depth analysis and empirical study of how
victims cope with crime in different ways).
122. Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 339, 213 S.E.2d 571, 580 (1975).
123. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 781, 392 S.E.2d at 393 (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. See, eg., State v. James, 321 N.C. 676, 365 S.E.2d 579 (1988); State v. Ferguson, 261 N.C.
558, 135 S.E.2d 626 (1964); State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E.2d 1 (1962); State v. Owens, 65 N.C.
App. 107, 308 S.E.2d 494 (1983); State v. Musselwhite, 59 N.C. App. 477, 297 S.E. 2d 181 (1982);
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court to consider on remand in determining whether a shooting victim had sus-
tained "serious bodily injury."'12 7 The court advised the trial court to find out
how the doctors removed the bullets, how deep the bullets penetrated and how
long the victim was hospitalized. 128 In State v. Owens,129 the court reiterated
that it would not provide an exact definition of serious injury, but it listed some
factors to use in determining whether there is sufficient evidence of serious in-
jury. 130 The Boone court stated that it was "impossible to enunciate a 'bright
line' rule as to when the acts of an accused cause mental upset that could sup-
port a finding of 'serious personal injury,' 131 but it did provide a guideline:
The injury has to extend "for some appreciable time beyond the incidents sur-
rounding the crime itself."'132
Although the Everhardt court diligently adhered to the case-by-case stan-
dard by not creating a bright-line rule, it broke with precedent by failing to
provide any specific reason why the evidence sufficiently established "serious
mental injury" in Mrs. Everhardt's case. The absence of some sort of frame-
work to guide future courts is the most troubling and inconsistent aspect of
Everhardt. The court simply states that the evidence is "compelling"' 133 without
giving any reason for this characterization.
The Everhardt court could have provided some guidelines without prof-
fering a bright-line rule and thus, without ignoring precedent. The fact that
Everhardt marks the first time mental injury has been considered as serious in-
jury in assault cases amplifies the need for direction. The court could have given
something more than a simple statement that the evidence was "compelling."' 134
The court should have emphasized the factors that it thought rendered the in-
jury a "serious mental injury." Mrs. Everhardt's injury had extended for an
extended period of time. 3 5 In addition, she received professional treatment on
four different occasions. 136 The court gave no indication if one of these factors
was conclusive or if both factors are required to establish serious mental injury.
To rectify the situation, the supreme court should grant discretionary re-
view to a case involving an assault inflicting serious mental injury. Even if the
court truly desires to clarify the standard on appeal, it may be too late to provide
significant assistance to the trial courts. For example, consider how long it took
for a case such as Everhardt to reach the court. The only consolation rests in
State v. Rotenberry, 54 N.C. App. 504, 284 S.E.2d 197 (1981); State v. Stephenson, 43 N.C. App.
323, 258 S.E.2d 806 (1979).
126. 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E.2d 1 (1962).
127. Id. at 91-92, 128 S.E.2d at 3. For a discussion of Jones, see supra note 31.
128. Id. at 92, 128 S.E.2d at 3.
129. 65 N.C. App. 107, 308 S.E.2d 494 (1983).
130. Id. at 111, 308 S.E.2d at 498. For a discussion of Owens, see supra note 31.
131. State v. Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 205, 297 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1982).
132. Id. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 590.
133. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 781, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
134. Id
135. Mrs. Everhardt was still undergoing treatment in 1987, almost three years after the assault
occurred. Id. at 779, 392 S.E.2d at 392; see Boone, 307 N.C. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 590 (court
considered an injury extending for "an appreciable amount of time" an important factor).
136. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 779, 392 S.E.2d at 392.
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somewhat of a patchwork checklist, established by piecing together evidence suf-
ficient to satisfy the "serious injury" element in prior decisions. The best sources
for such evidence are cases applying Boone's "appreciable length of time"
test.1 37 As the Boone court suggested, mental anguish incidental to the crime
will not suffice.1 38 Although not to the same degree as victims of rape, most
assault victims feel some sort of mental trauma and nervousness after the
crime.13 9 A study has shown that victims of personal crimes, such as assault,
are more likely to experience fear of future victimization and vulnerability to
future attacks on themselves, family, and neighbors. 140 But in proving "serious
mental injury," the State must look beyond the immediate impact on the victim
and common problems encountered by the majority of victims for proof of con-
tinuing pain and suffering.
Key factors in ascertaining whether an injury has met the "appreciable pe-
riod of time" standard include: hospitalization, 14 1 seeking professional treat-
ment, 142 loss of time from work, 143 and inability to cope in the every-day
world. 144 Courts also may wish to consider "difficulties in resuming normal
activities, depression, anxiety, a loss of emotional control, guilt, sleep distur-
bances, and obsessive thoughts about the crime incident." 145 A problem courts
may encounter is determining how long is an "appreciable period of time."
Boone indicates that the anguish has to extend beyond the time immediately
following the attack while Mayse 146 and Davis 147 show that it is sufficient for
the trauma to be present at least until the trial date, which was seven months
after the rape in Mayse.148 These parameters, however, produce unanswered
questions. First, courts must decide whether mental injury has to last as long as
the harm did in Mayse and Davis. Second, they also should determine whether
the trial date serves as a benchmark. Using the trial date as the touchstone
137. See Boone, 307 N.C. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 590 (1982); State v. Davis, 101 N.C. App. 12, 20,
398 S.E.2d 645, 652 (1990); State v. Mayse, 97 N.C. App. 559, 563, 389 S.E.2d 585, 587, cert. denied,
326 N.C. 803, 393 S.E.2d 903 (1990).
138. Boone, 307 N.C. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 589-90.
139. Lurigio, supra note 101, at 452.
140. Id. at 462-63.
141. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 779, 392 S.E.2d at 392 (the victim was hospitalized numerous times
for her mental injuries, a factor the court seemed to have considered vital to its analysis); see State v.
Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 65, 243 S.E.2d 367, 374 (1978) (hospitalization is a factor but not conclusive);
supra note 31.
142. Everhardt, 326 N.C. at 779, 392 SE.2d at 392 (the victim sought treatment from several
doctors); State v. Mayse, 97 N.C. App. 559, 563, 389 S.E.2d 585, 587, cert. denied, 326 N.C. 803,
393 S.E.2d 903 (1990) (the victim sought professional help from a mental health clinic and a shelter
for abused women).
143. State v. Owens, 65 N.C. App. 107, 111, 308 S.E.2d 494, 497 (1983) (loss of time from work
is one of the factors listed by the Owens court); see supra note 31.
144. Mayse, 97 N.C. App. at 563, 389 S.E.2d at 587 (the victim moved and quit her job because
of difficulties coping with her environment); see supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
145. Lurigio, supra note 101, at 463; see also State v. Davis, 101 N.C. App. 12, 31, 398 S.E.2d
645, 652 (1990) (factors such as appetite loss, severe headaches, nightmares, and sleep difficulties are
indicative of "serious mental injury").
146. 97 N.C. App. 559, 389 S.E.2d 585, cert denied, 326 N.C. 803, 393 S.E.2d 903 (1990).
147. 101 N.C. App. 12, 398 S.E.2d 645 (1990); see supra note 58.
148. Boone, 307 N.C. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 589-90; Mayse, 97 N.C. App. at 563-64; Davis, 101
N.C. App. at 23, 394 S.E.2d at 651-52.
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could prove problematic in light of the fact that not all trials take place "x"
months after a crime has been committed. A four to seven month standard may
be the best solution. In one study, symptoms of serious mental anxiety were
found to subside around six months after the incident. 149 This standard should
not be inflexible because, as previously stated, crime does not affect all victims in
the same manner. 150
The decision in Everhardt should not come as a great surprise considering
the growing concern about the impact of crime on assault victims' emotional
well-being' 5 1 and, more importantly, the recent attention given to emotional in-
jury by the North Carolina courts. 152 Despite the Everhardt court's failure to
provide lower courts minimal guidance in ascertaining "serious mental injury,"
the supreme court has taken an important step in the evolution of the recogni-
tion of the infliction of mental anguish, whether in the civil or criminal realm, as
a wrong to be remedied. Everhardt represents the adherence by the modern
supreme court to the principle established one hundred years earlier: "The mind
is no less a part of the person than the body."'15 3
COLLEEN KooNTz PiNYAN
149. Modlin, supra note 100, at 139-44.
150. Lurigio, supra note 101, at 453.
151. See, eg., Modlin, supra note 100; Lurigio, supra note 101.
152. See, eg., Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Ass'n, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85
(1990); State v. Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 297 S.E.2d 585 (1982).
153. Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N.C. 370, 385, 11 S.E. 1044, 1048 (1890).
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